18 Aug 2011
How Assessing and Managing Risk Are Different:
Professional football training
by Richard Belzer
in Regulatory Science
The Houston Texans are holding training camp in Houston, where it has been routinely very hot and humid. What the team is doing is making a clear distinction between the assessment of human health risk (in this case, from heatstroke and dehydration) and the management of these risks.
It's an interesting lesson showing why the conventional methods of human health risk assessment used by government are so flawed.
More...30 Jul 2011
'Food Deserts' or Mirages?
How many people live there?
by Richard Belzer
in Information Quality, Regulatory Science
Sometimes an urban "food deserts" is in fact a mirage because of a significant error in the data or a cramped, unrealistic definition of "low access" that disregards nearby stores in adjacent census tracts.
Only 7 census tracts in Washington, DC are identified as "food deserts." In one case, the reason is not a lack of access so much as the government's cramped definition of an acceptable grocery store. In one other case, the reason is the government's definition disregards large grocery stores in adjacent census tracts that lie within one mile of where people actually live. For the remaining five census tracts, no large grocery stores appear to be nearby under any reasonable definition of the term. But these census tracts are predominantly industrial.
More...29 Jul 2011
'Food Deserts' or Mirages?
A second look at the data
by Richard Belzer
in Information Quality, Regulatory Economics, Regulatory Science
Yesterday's post on the federal government's new program to eradicate "food deserts" provided an obvious example in which the database yields nonsensical results. A large US Army installation, one with its own grocery store, no unemployment, and essentially no poverty, nevertheless appeared to meet all of the government's (arbitrary) criteria for inclusion.
A closer look shows that there is yet another reason why this particular "food desert" is a mirage. Soldiers who live within this census tract actually do live within one mile of a second, large grocery store--albeit one that is in an adjacent census tract.
More...28 Jul 2011
'Food Deserts' or Mirages?
A look at the data
by Richard Belzer
in Information Quality, Regulatory Economics, Regulatory Policy, Regulatory Science
One of the latest trends in federal government food policy is the eradication of "food deserts" -- places where it is said to be difficult to find fresh produce. The Economic Research Service of the US Department of Agriculture has created an interactive map to help you learn whether you live in a "food desert".
The data are interesting, but perhaps not for the intended reason.
More...1 Apr 2011
Disease Clusters and Environmental Health:
Oral Testimony of Richard B. Belzer
by Richard Belzer
in Legislation, Regulatory Science
In his capacity as President of Regulatory Checkbook, Neutral Source's Managing Editor Richard Belzer was asked to testify before the US Senate on scientific and technical issues related to the identification and verification of environmental disease clusters. The bill under consideration is S. 76, the "Strengthening Protections for Children and Communities From Disease Clusters Act," co-sponsored by Sens. Boxer (D-CA) and Crapo (R-ID).
Neither Regulatory Checkbook nor Neutral Source take positions on or advocate the passage or defeat of substantive legislation.
The full oral testimony is reproduced below the jump.
The full written testimony is here.
More...31 Mar 2011
Disease Clusters and Environmental Health:
Written Testimony of Richard B. Belzer
by Richard Belzer
in Legislation, Regulatory Science
In his capacity as President of Regulatory Checkbook, Neutral Source's Managing Editor Richard Belzer was asked to testify before the US Senate on scientific and technical issues related to the identification and verification of environmental disease clusters. The bill under consideration is S. 76, the "Strengthening Protections for Children and Communities From Disease Clusters Act," co-sponsored by Sens. Boxer (D-CA) and Crapo (R-ID).
Neither Regulatory Checkbook nor Neutral Source take positions on or advocate the passage or defeat of substantive legislation.
The full written testimony is reproduced below the jump.
The full oral testimony is here.
More...26 Nov 2010
Airport Security, Part 4:
Irreconcilable differences
by Richard Belzer
in Regulatory Policy, Regulatory Science
Today's Wall Street Journal editorial page has a pair of commentaries taking nearly opposite positions on the recent controversy over TSA's screening procedures and practices. Gabriel Schoenfeld defends TSA's invasive pat-downs as necessary to prevent terror attacks using non-metallic weapons such as C-4 and PETN. Peggy Noonan says TSA has gone too far.
Schoenfeld and Noonan are opposed for at least two reasons:
- They have different perspectives about the tolerable risk of terrorism via aircraft. Noonan would tolerate higher risks than Schoenfeld.
- They have different perceptions of the intangible costs of enhanced screening. Noonan believes public support for TSA is declining (and will continue to do so) because invasive screening is humiliating and undignified. Schoenfeld believes these are acceptable costs to achieve better security.
25 Nov 2010
Airport Security, Part 3:
Does TSA invite terrorism?
by Richard Belzer
in Regulatory Policy, Regulatory Science
Controversy about the Transportation Security Administration's new screening technologies and procedures continues to intensify. The White House is reacting defensively. The chairman of the Senate homeland security committee, Sen. Joseph Lieberman (I-CT) is defending the new procedures. Opponents of advanced imaging technology have attempted to organize a nationwide "Opt-Out" yesterday, the busiest airline travel day of the year.
Travelers electing to opt-out face mandatory, invasive pat-downs. Should the number of opt-outers be substantial, the queue for invasive pat-downs could stretch TSA resources beyond their capacity. This is the result organizers intend. They hope to persuade TSA to relent on its one-size-fits-all approach to airport security. TSA Administrator John Pistole first said he would not budge and criticized proponents of the opt-out campaign for causing massive delays and missed flights, then appeared to give ground after his position was undermined by Secretary of State Clinton and President Obama. According to Pistole, the new, invasive pat-down procedure is needed to prevent threats such as the so-called Christmas Day bombing attempt 11 months ago. (The implied 11-month delay in TSA's response is not explained.)
Pistole displays a tone of bureaucratic defensiveness that suggests he's primarily concerned with how he would be treated in the event that an aircraft is successfully targeted by a terrorist:
"I would hate to think what happens if the government caves in on this and relaxes these procedures and someone manages to get on board a plane and causes harm," Pistole said Monday in an interview on NBC's "TODAY" show. "Imagine what you will be asked."
A closer look suggests suggests that TSA's screening procedures are illogical even if Pistole's position is taken at face value. This reinforces the hypothesis we previously suggested, but considered very unlikely, that the reason TSA is forcing invasive pat-downs is to overcome travelers' objections to advanced imaging. If travelers object strenuously enough to invasive pat-downs, they will begin to prefer advanced imaging technology as the lesser of two evils. This is a sensible strategy if TSA intends to replace all metal detectors with advanced imaging devices but recognizes that travelers will agree to it only if they have no other option.
More...24 Nov 2010
Airport Security, Part 2:
"Analysis of the "don't touch my junk" episode
by Richard Belzer
in Regulatory Policy, Regulatory Science
John Tyner, heretofore an anonymous blogger, is now a public celebrity. According to Tyner, TSA forced him to submit to an invasive pat-down, which led to his now famous imprecation. Apparently, millions have seen the video he recorded of the encounter; his description of it and his several follow-up blog posts reveal much more about inherent flaws in TSA's airport security regime.
More...17 Nov 2010
Airport Security:
Has TSA lost its way?
by Richard Belzer
in Regulatory Policy, Regulatory Science
The Transportation Security Administration acknowledges that its screening procedures have become much more invasive. TSA administrator John Pistole defends them as necessary to provide the best possible security for air travelers. However, he does not provide a reasoned basis for this conclusion -- for example, what incremental security benefits new procedures provide compared with the incremental costs in lost privacy. Pistole's argument reduces to the notion that any increase in inspection intensity is justified if Pistole decides that it is.
Both the new security procedures and Pistole's unwillingness to provide a reasoned basis for them have provoked widespread opprobrium. Is there a constructive path forward, or has TSA lost its way?
More...2 Jan 2010
Airline Security after Abdulmutallab:
Is TSA behaving rationally?
by Richard Belzer
in Regulatory Policy, Regulatory Science
After Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab failed to blow up Northwest Airlines Flight 253 on Christmas Day, the Transportation Security Administration issued a directive requiring airlines to immediately make major changes in their operations.
Travel bloggers Christopher Elliott and Steve Frischling published the directive. On December 29, both were served with subpoenas demanding the surrender by December 31 of all private records that might reveal the identity of the source. Frischling surrendered his computer to federal agents on December 30. Predictably, they destroyed it rather than return it. Elliott contested the subpoena and TSA withdrew them on December 31.
Whether TSA's actions were legal (or should have been illegal) is an interesting question. What is more immediately interesting is that the directive itself implies a higher concern about the appearance of safety than safety itself. Nothing in the directive would have prevented Abdulmutallab from bombing Flight 253 or prevent a similarly equipped terrorist from blowing up an airliner tomorrow.
